WHEN YOU FOLLOW A BOT

When we open a social network and encounter a great deal of content supporting the same opinion, we might get the impression that this position is particularly widespread.

Videos, comments, shares and followers can contribute to creating a perception of popularity.

But what happens when some of this activity does not come from people spontaneously participating in the discussion?

In March 2026, during the campaign for the Bulgarian parliamentary elections of 19 April, TikTok identifies and shuts down the activity of a network consisting of 34 inauthentic accounts, with a total of 66,763 followers.

According to the platform, the network operated from Bulgaria, targeted a Bulgarian audience and was used to artificially amplify content supporting the DPS–New Beginning party.

The accounts had been created or used to spread political messages through coordinated activity, making that content potentially appear more popular than it would have been through spontaneous participation.

TikTok also stated that the network coordinated activity across multiple online platforms.

The case was also brought to public attention thanks to the work of the Balkan Free Media Initiative (BFMI), an organisation that monitors information and possible digital manipulation in South-Eastern Europe.

Through the TikTokcracy Tracker research project, BFMI had analysed the circulation of political content online and reported suspicious behaviour. According to the organisation itself, TikTok initiated its own investigations and took action after receiving this information.

The case was shared with The Disinformation Diaries by the Municipality of Sandanski, a Bulgarian partner in the ELECTRA project. 

The distinctive feature of this case does not necessarily concern the falsity of the individual messages circulated. The documented problem is the way that content was promoted.

A network of profiles operating in a coordinated manner can artificially increase the visibility of certain narratives, making it difficult to distinguish spontaneous user participation from organised activity.

This is a different mechanism from simply publishing a political opinion.

Expressing a point of view, supporting a proposal, sharing a video or participating in a discussion are legitimate activities in democratic life. The problematic element emerges when the origin, identity or coordination of accounts is concealed or falsified in order to influence public perception.

In the Bulgarian case, the network identified by TikTok could have contributed to giving a distorted impression of the popularity of the messages it supported.

This does not mean that the accounts determined voters' choices.

The available information does not allow us to establish whether, and to what extent, the activity changed citizens' opinions or the election results.

The case does show us, however, how online visibility can be manipulated and how important it is not to automatically confuse apparent popularity with genuine support.

Information about the war in Ukraine

In his contribution to ELECTRA, the representative of the Municipality of Sandanski also recounts a personal experience, separate from the case of the TikTok accounts.

He had come across some posts on social networks claiming that Bulgaria would send soldiers to fight in Ukraine.

The claim was circulating in political discussions and, initially, he had found it difficult to understand the actual content of the Bulgarian government's decision. To clarify his doubts, he consulted a fact-checking source.

Through this verification, he came to distinguish between two very different situations: the possible participation of Bulgarian military personnel in training activities as part of a European mission and the deployment of soldiers to fight directly on Ukrainian territory.

The distinction is fundamental because information can be misleading even when it starts from a real fact, if its context is changed or consequences different from those actually envisaged are attributed to it.

The partner does not specify when he encountered those posts and does not provide the original links. We therefore cannot reconstruct the exact path of the news.

The experience does, however, show a concrete practice: instead of relying on the claims encountered during the discussion, the participant sought independent verification

This experience gives rise to the suggestion that the Bulgarian partner proposes to the Living Library. The practice is called Lateral Reading, or "lettura laterale" in Italian. The principle is simple.

When we encounter an online claim that we are unfamiliar with or that leaves us with doubts, instead of staying only on the website or page that publishes it, we can open other browser tabs and look for independent information.

Who is the author? Can they be identified? What evidence is presented? Do other reliable sources confirm the information?

The partner recounts using this method to check the origin of content, evaluate the evidence supporting claims and compare what he reads with other sources. No particularly complex tools are needed.

What matters is developing the habit of not limiting ourselves to the information that a single page chooses to show us.

In his contribution, the representative of Sandanski also emphasises the role that journalists, civic organisations and digital platforms can play in identifying coordinated behaviour and misleading content.

The case of the 34 accounts demonstrates the importance of this collaboration: an independent organisation conducted research, the platform carried out investigations and took action against the network identified.

Responsibility for keeping the information ecosystem reliable, therefore, cannot be entrusted solely to individual citizens.